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Abstract
In this paper, inspired by the work of Megiddo on the formation of preferences and strategic
analysis, we consider an early market model studied in the field of economic theory, in which
each trader’s utility may be influenced by the bundles of goods obtained by her social neighbors.
The goal of this paper is to understand and characterize the impact of social influence on the
complexity of computing and approximating market equilibria.
We present complexity-theoretic and algorithmic results for approximating market equilibria
in this model with focus on two concrete influence models based on the traditional linear utility
functions. Recall that an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium in a conventional exchange market
with linear utility functions can be computed in polynomial time by convex programming. Our
complexity results show that even a bounded-degree, planar influence network can significantly
increase the difficulty of equilibrium computation even in markets with only a constant number of
goods. Our algorithmic results suggest that finding an approximate equilibrium in markets with
hierarchical influence networks might be easier than that in markets with arbitrary neighborhood
structures. By demonstrating a simple market with a constant number of goods and a bounded-
degree, planar influence graph whose equilibrium is PPAD-hard to approximate, we also provide
a counterexample to a common belief, which we refer to as the myth of a constant number of
goods, that equilibria in markets with a constant number of goods are easy to compute or easy
to approximate.
∗Most of the work was done while the author was a postdoc at University of Southern California, where this
research was supported by a USC startup fund.
†This research is supported by an NSF grant CCF-0964481.
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1 Introduction
In mathematical economics, the general equilibrium theory has laid the foundation for competitive
pricing [1, 24]. This theory was based on the supply-equal-demand principle of Adam Smith and
Le´on Walras [26]. For pricing in an exchange economy, the demand of a trader is usually modeled
by a utility function which assigns each bundle of goods a non-negative value. An equilibrium price
then leads the system to an efficient allocation of goods among traders. The pioneering equilibrium
theorem of Arrow and Debreu [1] asserts the existence of market equilibria for a very general model
of exchange markets.
In the traditional exchange model [1, 24], each trader’s utility depends only on the bundle of
goods she obtains after the exchange. However, this view of demand may have some limitations —
many people’s interests and value may be influenced by their social interactions [20]. For example,
the more friends with iPhones that one has, the cheaper potentially it is for one to talk to them
using an iPhone (due to the in-network service), and hence having an iPhone may be more valuable.
In the age of ubiquitous social networks, it might be desirable to model markets and exchanges
where traders’ valuation and utilities are influenced by what their social neighbors have.
In this paper, we consider a market model in which each trader’s utility is potentially influenced
by the bundles of goods possessed by her social neighbors. The mathematical properties of this
market model and its extensions have been extensively studied in economic theory, for example by
Fo¨llmer [14], Evstigneev and Takasar [13, 12], and Horst and Scheinkman [16]. Formally, a market
in this model is defined by traders’ initial endowments of goods, a social network among traders,
and traders’ utility functions that capture their valuations under social influence. One can extend
the equilibrium theorem of Arrow and Debreu to prove the existence of equilibria in this market
model with social influence.
The goal of this paper is to understand and characterize the impact of social influence on the
complexity of computing and approximating market equilibria. To this end, we focus on two con-
crete influence models based on the traditional linear utility functions (to be defined below). We
present both complexity-theoretic and algorithmic results for approximating an equilibrium in the
two settings. Our complexity results show that even a bounded-degree and planar social network
can significantly increase the difficulty of equilibrium computation even in markets only a constant
number of goods. (Recall that a market equilibrium in a conventional Arrow-Debrau exchange mar-
ket with linear utilities can be computed in polynomial time by convex programming [11, 23].) Our
algorithmic results suggest that finding an approximate equilibrium in markets with hierarchical
influence networks might be easier than that in markets with arbitrary neighborhood structures.
Our study of the market model with social influence is inspired by the work of Megiddo [22]
on the formation of preferences and strategic analysis. In his work on game theory [22], Megiddo
argued that, in some situations, players have to start analyzing the game before they have formed
their preferences over the outcomes of the game. However, strategic analysis naturally depends on
preferences. He presented a generalization of Nash’s equilibrium theorem to resolve this dilemma,
proving that equilibrium strategies exist in his more general model of non-cooperative games.
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When extending his view from game theory to mathematical economics, where traders’ pref-
erences are their utilities, traders have to start analyzing the market before they have completely
formed their utilities, and their utility functions depend on what their social neighbors have. The
extension of Arrow-Debreu’s equilibrium theorem in the market model with social influence can be
viewed as an analog of Megiddo’s equilibrium theorem for games.
While our primary intended contribution is to understand the impact of social influence on the
complexity of market equilibria, we also intend to challenge a common belief that the equilibria of
markets with a constant number of goods are easy to compute or easy to approximate, due to the
success in [7] and [9]. We refer to this belief as the myth of a constant number of goods. By demon-
strating a simple market with a constant number of goods and a bounded-degree, planar influence
graph whose equilibrium is PPAD-hard to approximate, we provide a natural counterexample to
this belief. This example also helps to enhance our own appreciation of the results in [7, 9].
We also made a few technical contributions in this paper. We consider two concrete influence
functions based on the linear utility functions. In our linear influence model, we allow neighbors’
possessions to influence the slopes of a trader’s linear utility function. In our threshold influence
model, we allow neighbors’ possessions to influence the thresholds of a trader’s additively separable
and piecewise-linear utility function. For both models, we show that finding a approximate market
equilibrium is PPAD-hard. In these proofs we introduce several schematic refinements to the work
of Chen et al [3, 5] that computing an equilibrium in a market with additively separable, piecewise-
linear and concave utilities is PPAD-hard. In particular, for the linear influence model we prove
that even when there are only four goods and the influence network is a bounded-degree, planar
graph, the equilibrium approximation problem is still PPAD-hard. Indeed both proofs work for
the special case of Fisher’s model [2, 5, 25]. We hope our PPAD-hardness constructions will help
to resolve more complexity-theoretic questions concerning other exchange markets.
Algorithmically, we present a divide-&-conquer algorithm for computing an approximate equi-
librium in an Arrow-Debreu market with a constant number of goods and whose influence network
is hierarchical. Let m denote the number of traders. We show that if a market with a hierarchical
influence network has a constant number of goods and has an equilibrium in which the magnitude
of the price of every good is at least 1/ma for some constant a > 0, then a polynomially-precised-
approximate market equilibrium can be found in time mO(logm). Hence, although our algorithm is
relatively simple, it offers a contrasting example to our complexity results on markets with arbitrary
influence networks. In that case, we show that it is PPAD-hard to compute a polynomially-precised
approximate equilibrium, even though the market has only four goods and its influence graph is
planar with a bounded degree, and all four prices are roughly 1/4 in any of its approximate equili-
brium. In other words, equilibrium approximation in markets with hierarchical influence networks
might be easier than that in markets with arbitrary influence networks.
We hope our work is a step towards characterizing the impact of social influence on the com-
plexity of computing and approximating market equilibria.
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2 The Model and Our Main Results
We let G = {G1, . . . , Gh} denote a set of h divisible goods and T = {T1, . . . , Tm} denote a set of m
traders. For each trader Tk, k ∈ [m], we use wk ∈ R
h
+ to denote her initial endowment and xk ∈ R
h
+
to denote her allocation after the exchange. We always assume that the total supply of each good
Gj ∈ G in the market is Θ(1), i.e.,
∑
k∈[m]wk,j = Θ(1) for all j ∈ [h]. We call the variable xk,j in
xk, j ∈ [h], the allocation variable of Tk for Gj or simply the Gj-variable of Tk.
Each trader Tk also has a utility function uk. In the classical Arrow-Debreu market model [1],
uk only depends on the allocation variables xk,j of Tk and is a function from R
h
+ to R+. In this
paper we consider a more general market model with social influence. The major difference is that
the utility function uk of Tk depends on not only her own allocation xk but also the allocations of
other traders in the market. In general, uk could be a function over all the allocation variables:
uk : (R
h
+)
m → R+. We then call the tuple M = (G,T ,wk, uk : k ∈ [m]) an Arrow-Debreu market
with social influence.
Market equilibria can be defined similarly for this model. For convenience, we follow the con-
vention and use x−k to denote the m− 1 allocation vectors (x1, . . . ,xk−1,xk+1, . . . ,xm).
Definition 1 (Equilibria in Markets with Social Influence). A market equilibrium in a market M
with social influence is a price vector p ∈ Rh+ together with allocations x1, . . . ,xm ∈ R
h
+ such that
1. The market clears: for every good Gj ∈ G, we have
∑
k∈[m] xk,j =
∑
k∈[m]wk,j.
2. Every trader gets a budget-feasible and optimal bundle: for every Tk ∈ T , we have
• xk · p ≤ wk · p; and
• uk
(
xk,x−k
)
≥ uk
(
x,x−k
)
for all x ∈ Rh+ such that x · p ≤ wk · p.
The mathematical properties of this model and its extensions have been extensively studied in
economic theory. An equilibrium always exists under mild conditions. In particular, it always exists
for the two classes of utility functions (to be defined in Section 2.2) considered in the paper. We
state the existence theorem in Section 2.2 and include the proof in Appendix A for completeness.
2.1 Social Influence Graphs
Given a market M with social influence, we define its social influence graph GM as follows: The
vertex set is T , the set of traders; there is a direct edge from Tj to Tk if and only if the utility uk of
Tk depends on (or is influenced by) at least one allocation variable of Tj . We use N(Tk) to denote
the set of predecessors of Tk in GM. We call N(Tk) the influencing neighbors of trader Tk.
In Section 3 and 4, we study the complexity of computing an approximate market equilibrium
(see the definition below) in a market with various families of influence graphs. To make this search
problem more concrete, we will focus on the following two types of utility functions.
4
2.2 Linear and Threshold Influence Utility Functions
Let M be a market and GM be its social influence graph. Consider trader Tk ∈ T .
Definition 2 (Linear Influence Functions). We call the utility function uk(xk,xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)) of
trader Tk a linear influence function if it has the following form:
uk
(
xk,xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)
)
=
∑
i∈[h]
(
ck,i + fk,i
(
xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)
))
xk,i, (1)
where ck,i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [h] and fk,i is a linear form over the allocation variables {xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)}
with non-negative 1 weights.
Note that once {xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)} are fixed, the utility function uk becomes a linear function.
Definition 3 (Threshold Influence Functions). We call the utility function uk(xk,xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk))
of Tk a threshold influence function if it has the following form:
uk
(
xk,xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)
)
=
∑
i∈[h]
(
ck,i · xk,i +min
(
0, fk,i
(
xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)
)
− dk,i · xk,i
))
, (2)
where ck,i ≥ dk,i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [h] and fk,i is a linear form over the allocation variables {xj : Tj ∈
N(Tk)} with non-negative weights.
Note that once {xj : Tj ∈ N(Tk)} are fixed, uk becomes an additively separable and piecewise
linear function:
uk(x) = uk,1(xk,1) + · · ·+ uk,h(xk,h).
For each i ∈ [h], either uk,i is a linear function with slope ck,i (when dk,i = 0); or uk,i is piecewise-
linear and the slopes of the two segments are ck,i and ck,i − dk,i respectively (when dk,i > 0), with
the threshold being fk,i/dk,i.
Since scaling uk does not affect the preference of Tk over different bundles, we always assume
that the linear and threshold influence utility functions are normalized : All the parameters in (1)
and (2) (including ck,i, dk,i as well as the weights in fk,i) are between 0 and 1.
For these two classes of utility functions, a market equilibrium always exists under mild condi-
tions. We include the proof of Theorem 1 below in Appendix A for completeness. The proof also
implies that finding an approximate equilibrium (see the definition and discussion in Section 2.3)
is in the class TFNP. We need the following definition.
Definition 4 (Nonsatiation). A function f over Rℓ+ is said to be nonsatiated, if for all x ∈ R
ℓ
+,
there exists an x′ ∈ Rℓ+ such that f(x) < f(x
′). f is said to be nonsatiated with respect to the ith
variable if for all x ∈ Rℓ+, there exists an x
′ ∈ Rℓ+ with x
′
j = xj for all j 6= i such that f(x) < f(x
′).
1Of course in general the weights can be negative but then the sufficient conditions in Theorem 1 have to be
changed accordingly. In this paper we only focus on the non-negative case.
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Definition 5 (Economy Graphs). Given a market M with social influence, we use HM to denote
the following directed graph. The vertex set is T , the set of traders in M. For every two traders
Tj , Tk ∈ T , we have an edge from Tj to Tk if there exists an integer i ∈ [h] such that wj,i > 0 and
and uk is nonsatiated with respect to xk,i. HM is then called the economy graph of M [6, 21].
Note that if the utilities in M are linear influence functions, then there is an edge from Tj to
Tk iff there exists an i ∈ [h] such that wj,i > 0 and ck,i > 0. Similarly, if the utilities are threshold
influence functions, then there is an edge from Tj to Tk iff there exists an i ∈ [h] such that wj,i > 0
and ck.i − dk,i > 0.
Theorem 1 (Existence). A market M with linear influence (or threshold influence) functions has
a market equilibrium if the following two conditions hold:
1. The economy graph HM is strongly connected; and
2. For every Gi ∈ G, there exists a Tk ∈ T such that uk is nonsatiated with respect to xk,i.
2.3 Approximation of Market Equilibria
In both our complexity-theoretic and algorithmic studies, we use the following notion of (weakly)
approximate equilibria.
Definition 6 (ǫ-Approximate Equilibria). (p,x1, . . . ,xm) is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium if
1.
∑
i∈[h] pi = 1;
2. For every trader Tk ∈ T , her budget is approximately feasible: xk · p ≤ wk · p+ ǫ;
3. For every trader Tk ∈ T , her allocation xk is approximately optimal:
uk(x,x−k) ≤ uk(xk,x−k) + ǫ, for any x ∈ R
h
+ such that x · p ≤ wk · p;
4. The market is approximately cleared: For every good Gi ∈ G,∣∣∣∑k∈[m]wk,i −∑k∈[m] xk,i ∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ.
Remark 1. The main reason why we adopted the weaker approximation notion above, instead of
using the standard one in which both conditions 2 and 3 above must hold exactly, is to guarantee the
existence of a rational ǫ-approximate market equilibrium for any ǫ > 0 so that the search problems
considered in Section 3 and 4 are well defined. It is not clear to us whether a market with rational
linear/threshold influence functions always has a rational equilibrium, or even an approximate one
if conditions 2 and 3 must hold exactly. With the approximation notion above, one can follow the
proof of Theorem 1 to show that the following problem belongs to TFNP:
Given a market M with linear (or threshold) influence functions, find an ǫ-approximate
market equilibrium with ǫ = 2−max(h,m).
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In Section 3, we prove the following PPAD-hardness results.
1. In Section 3.2, we show that the problem of finding an m−16-approximate equilibrium in a
market with linear influence utilities is PPAD-hard, even when the market has only four
goods and the social influence graph is bounded-degree and planar. This contrasts with the
classical linear Arrow-Debreu model, for which efficient algorithms are known
[11, 23, 7, 8, 17, 15, 18, 10, 27].
2. In Section 3.3, we show that when arbitrarily many goods are allowed, finding an
m−11-approximate equilibrium in a market with threshold influence utilities is PPAD-hard,
even when the influence graph is bounded-degree and planar.
Both PPAD-hardness results actually hold for the special Fisher’s market model.
In Section 4, we show that if the social influence graph GM of M has a hierarchical structure
(see definition in Section 4.2); and the number of goods in M is a constant; and M has a market
equilibrium in which 1/pi is bounded above by m
a for some constant a > 0 for all i ∈ [h], then a
1/poly(m)-approximate market equilibrium can be found in time mO(log(m)).
3 Hardness of Markets with Social Influence
3.1 Two-Player Matrix Games and Their Nash Equilibria
A two-player game is defined by a pair of payoff matrices (A,B) of its two players. Here we assume
both players have n choices of actions, so A and B are square matrices with n rows and columns.
(In this section, we will always use n to denote the size of A and B.) We let ∆n ⊂ Rn denote the
set of probability distributions of n dimensions.
A pair of probability distributions (x,y), x,y ∈ ∆n, is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B), if
Aiy
T < Ajy
T =⇒ xi = 0 and xBi < xBj =⇒ yi = 0, for all i, j ∈ [n].
where we let Ai and Bi denote the ith row vector of A and ith column vector of B, respectively.
Definition 7 (Well-Supported Nash Equilibria). For ǫ > 0, we say (x,y) is an ǫ-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of (A,B), if x,y ∈ ∆n and for all i, j ∈ [n], we have
Aiy
T + ǫ < Ajy
T =⇒ xi = 0 and xBi + ǫ < xBj =⇒ yi = 0. (3)
Definition 8 (Normalized and Sparse Two-Player Games). A two-player game (A,B) is normal-
ized if every entry of A and B is between −1 and 1. It is sparse if every row and every column of
A and B have at most 10 nonzero entries.
Let Sparse-Nash denote the problem of finding an n−6-well-supported Nash equilibrium in an
n×n sparse and normalized two-player game, where each payoff entry is a rational number that is
specified as the ratio of two integers. We will use the following hardness result:
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Theorem 2 (Sparse Two-Player Nash [4]). Sparse-Nash is PPAD-complete.
3.2 Markets with Linear Influence Utilities
Building on the scheme introduced in [3, 5], we reduce Sparse-Nash to the following problem:
Planar-Linear-Market: The input is a market M = (G,T ,wk, uk) satisfying all
the conditions of Theorem 1, in which
1. The number of goods |G| is at most 4;
2. Every utility function uk is a (normalized) linear influence function; and
3. The influence graph GM is a bounded-degree, planar graph.
The output is then an m−16-approximate market equilibrium, where m = |T |.
Theorem 3 (Main). Planar-Linear-Market is PPAD-hard.
3.2.1 The Construction
Let (A,B) be an n×n normalized and sparse two-player game. We first construct from (A,B), in
polynomial time, a market M with only two goods and linear influence utilities, such that every
1/n15-approximate market equilibrium of M gives us a 1/n6-well-supported Nash equilibrium of
(A,B). However, its influence graph GM might not be planar. In Section 3.2.3, we show how to
revise the construction so that the influence graph is planar.
Let α = 1/n3, β = 1/n10 and γ = 1/n4. The market M consists of the following traders:{
T,Xi, Yi, Ui,j, Vi,j , Ai,k, Bi,k : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n], i 6= j, k ∈ [n− 2]
}
.
They have the following initial endowments: (1) the initial endowment of T is (1, 1), one unit of
each good; and (2) the initial endowment of any other trader is (α,α). As a result, the total supply
of each good is 1 +O(1/n).
Remark 2. The market constructed here is in fact a Fisher market (with social influence).
Utility Function of T :
The utility of T only depends on her own allocation. We set the slopes of both goods to be 1.
Utility Function of Xi, i ∈ [n]:
Other than her own allocation, the utility function of Xi also depends on that of Ai,1. For conve-
nience we use ai,1 to denote the G1-allocation variable of Ai,1. Then we set the parameters of Xi’s
utilities appropriately so that the slope of good G1 is 1 + γ and the slope of good G2 is 1 + ai,1.
As it will become clear later, the G1-allocation variables of Xi, i ∈ [n], denoted by xi, will be
used to encode the probability distribution of the first player in the two-player game (A,B).
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Utility Function of Yi, i ∈ [n]:
Other than her own allocation, the utility of Yi only depends on that of Bi,1. We let bi,1 denote the
G1-allocation variable of Bi,1. Then we set the parameters of Yi’s utilities appropriately so that
the slope of good G1 is 1 + γ and the slope of good G2 is 1 + bi,1.
As it will become clear later, the G1-allocation variables of Yi, i ∈ [n], denoted by yi, will be
used to encode the probability distribution of the second player in the two-player game (A,B).
Utility Functions of Ui,j and Vi,j, i 6= j ∈ [n]:
The role of Ui,j is to enforce the following Nash equilibrium constraint:
Aiy
T + ǫ < Ajy
T =⇒ xi = 0,
where, as mentioned above, we use xi to denote the G1-allocation variable of Xi and yi to denote
the G1-allocation variable of Yi.
To this end, we let
Ci,ℓ =
max(0, Ai,ℓ −Aj,ℓ)
2
and Di,ℓ =
max(0, Aj,ℓ −Ai,ℓ)
2
, for every ℓ ∈ [n].
Hence we have 0 ≤ Ci,ℓ,Di,ℓ ≤ 1 and Ai −Aj = 2(Ci −Dj).
The utility function of Ui,j depends on yℓ, the G1-allocation variable of Yℓ with
Ai,ℓ −Aj,ℓ = 2(Ci,ℓ −Di,ℓ) 6= 0.
Since A is a sparse matrix, there can be at most 20 such ℓ’s. We set the parameters of Ui,j’s utility
appropriately so that the slopes of the two goods are
1 +D · yT and 1 + β +C · yT ,
respectively. Similarly the role of Vi,j is to enforce the following constraint:
xBi + ǫ < xBj =⇒ yi = 0.
Her utility is similar to that of Ui,j except that it depends on xℓ, the G1-allocation variable of Xℓ
with Bℓ,i −Bℓ,j 6= 0. We omit the details here.
Utility Functions of Ai,k and Bi,k, i ∈ [n], k ∈ [n− 2]:
The role of the traders Ai,k, k ∈ [n− 2], is the following. Let ai,j denote the G1-allocation variable
of Ai,j, and ui,j denote the G1-allocation variable of Ui,j . Then we need to set the utilities of Ai,1,
. . . , Ai,n−2 appropriately so that in every approximate market equilibrium, we have
∃ j : ui,j is large =⇒ ai,1 is large and ∀ j : ui,j is close to 0 =⇒ ai,1 is close to 0,
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while keeping the degree of the influence graph small. In particular, the utility of Ai,k only depends
on two other traders.
To this end, we set the utilities as follows. Here we take i = 1 as an example. The general case
can be done similarly. If k = n− 2, then the utility of A1,k depends on both U1,n−1 and U1,n. We
set the slopes of her utility function to be
1 + u1,n−1 + u1,n and 1 + γ.
For each k < n− 1, the utility of Ai,k depends on both A1,k+1 and U1,k+1. We set the slopes of her
utility function to be
1 + a1,k+1 + u1,k+1 and 1 + γ.
The utilities of Bi,k’s, k ∈ [n− 2], are set similarly, and we omit the details here.
3.2.2 Correctness of the Reduction
It is easy to check that the market constructed satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 1, and the
degree of its influence graph is bounded by 20 (though may not be planar yet).
Now suppose we have an ǫ-approximate equilibrium where ǫ = 1/n15 (in which the sum of the
prices p1 + p2 is equal to 1).
First we show that p1 and p2 must be very close to 1/2.
Lemma 1. In every ǫ-approximate equilibrium, p1, p2 ∈ [1/2 − λ, 1/2 + λ] with λ = 1/n
14.
Proof. Suppose this is not the case and without loss of generality, p1 < 1/2− λ and p2 > 1/2 + λ.
First the budget of T is 1 since her initial endowment is (1, 1). Also it is clear that the optimal
bundle for her is (1/p1, 0) with utility 1/p1. Let (t1, t2) be the allocation of T in the ǫ-approximate
equilibrium, then by definition (conditions 2 and 3) we have
t1 · p1 + t2 · p2 ≤ 1 + ǫ and t1 + t2 ≥ 1/p1 − ǫ.
It then follows that
t2 ≤
ǫ(1 + p1)
p2 − p1
≤
2ǫ
2λ
=
1
n
.
However, the total budget of all other traders in the market is
Θ(n2) · (α · p1 + α · p2) = Θ (1/n) .
As a result, even if they spend all the money on G2, they can consume at most
O(1/n)
p2
= O
(
1
n
)
of G2 and the total consumption of G2 is O(1/n). This contradicts with the assumption since the
total supply of G2 is 1 + Θ(1/n).
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Next, we let x = (x1, . . . , xn) denote the vector in which xi is the G1-allocation variable of Xi;
and y = (y1, . . . , yn) denote the vector in which yi is the G1-allocation variable of Yi, i ∈ [n]. We
show that after rounding:
x′i =
{
0 if xi = O(1/n
12)
xi otherwise
and y′i =
{
0 if yi = O(1/n
12)
yi otherwise
and normalization:
x∗i =
x′i∑
i∈[n] x
′
i
and y∗i =
y′i∑
i∈[n] y
′
i
,
the pair of distributions (x∗,y∗) must be a 1/n6-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B). To
this end, we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let k ∈ [n] be any index that maximizes Aky
T , then we must have xk = Ω(1/n
3);
Let k ∈ [n] be any index that maximizes xBk, then we must have yk = Ω(1/n
3).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume A1y
T = maxkAky
T .
Now we examine traders U1,j , j ∈ [2 : n]. For each j ∈ [2 : n], by the construction, the slopes
of the two goods G1, G2 of U1,j are
1 +DyT and 1 + β +CyT ,
respectively, where
(C−D)yT = (A1y
T −Ajy
T )/2 ≥ 0.
Since the budget of U1,j is α, her optimal bundle is (0, α/p2) with utility α(1 + β +Cy
T )/p2. Let
(s1, s2) denote the allocation of U1,j in the approximate equilibrium, then by definition we have
s1 · p1 + s2 · p2 ≤ α+ ǫ and s1(1 +Dy
T ) + s2(1 + β +Cy
T ) ≥ α(1 + β +CyT )/p2 − ǫ.
It then follows that s1 = O(ǫ/β) = O(1/n
5)≪ γ.
Similarly it can be shown by induction that for every trader A1,j, j ∈ [n− 2], her G1-allocation
variable a1,j satisfies a1,j = O(ǫ/γ) = O(1/n
11) and in particular, a1,1 = O(1/n
11). With this, the
slopes of trader X1 becomes
1 + γ = 1 + 1/n4 and 1 +O(1/n11)
for the two goods, respectively. Using the same argument, it is easy to show that
x1 = Ω
(
α
p1
)
= Ω
(
1
n3
)
.
The second part for y can be proved similarly.
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Lemma 3. For all i 6= j ∈ [n], we have
Aiy
T + 4/n10 < Ajy
T =⇒ xi = O(1/n
12) and xBi + 4/n
10 < xBj =⇒ yi = O(1/n
12).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume (A1 −Aj)y
T < −4/n10 for some j 6= 1.
First of all, the slopes of trader U1,j are
1 +DyT and 1 + 1/n10 +CyT ,
respectively. Since (C −D)yT = (A1 −Aj)y
T /2 < −2/n10, her optimal bundle is (α/p1, 0) with
utility α(1 +DyT )/p1. It is then easy to show that in an ǫ-approximate equilibrium her allocation
of G1 must satisfy u1,j = Ω(1/n
3).
Next one can show that, by induction, all traders A1,1, . . . , A1,j−1 like G1 much better than G2
and in any ǫ-approximate market equilibrium, we have a1,1 = Ω(1/n
3). As a result, trader X1 likes
G2 much better than G1 and it can be shown that x1 = O(ǫ · n
3) = O(1/n12).
By combining the two lemmas above, it is easy to show that (x∗,y∗) is a 1/n6-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of (A,B), proving the correctness of the reduction.
3.2.3 Reduction to Markets with Planar Influence Graphs
We next show that the hardness result remains to hold even if the influence graph is planar. Let
(A,B) be a sparse two-player game and M be the market constructed above. We set
α = 1/n9, β = 1/n16, and γ = 1/n10.
We also add two new goods to the market M so that there are totally four goods G1, G2, G3, G4.
We change the initial endowments and utilities of the traders in M as follows:
1. The initial endowment of T is now (1, 1, 1, 1) (and thus, her budget is still 1);
2. The initial endowment of any other trader in M is (α,α, α, α) (and thus, her budget is α);
3. The utility function of T now has slope 1 for all of the four goods; and the utility of any
other trader remains unchanged (so they are only interested in goods G1 and G2).
Let GM be the influence graph of M. We first compute (in polynomial time) a planar embedding
of the directed graph GM so that no three directed edges intersect at the same point. Let S denote
the set of all intersections in this planar embedding. We then add a new trader for each intersection
S ∈ S and call her trader S. For each direct edge TiTj in GM, letting TiS1, S1S2, . . . , SℓTj be the
segments along TiTj in the embedding, we add a new trader for each segment SkSk+1, k ∈ [ℓ− 1],
and for SℓTj. We call them trader SkSk+1 and trader SℓTj, respectively, for convenience.
The total number of traders is bounded by O(n8) since there are only O(n2) traders in M. All
the new traders have the same initial endowment (α,α, α, α) (and thus, all of them have budget
α). Let ǫ = 1/n32. Then given any ǫ-approximate equilibrium of this new market (even though we
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have not set the utilities of the new traders yet), we can show the following lemma concerning the
price vector p (with
∑
i∈[4] pi = 1). The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 so we omit it here.
Lemma 4. In any ǫ-approximate equilibrium, p1, p2, p3, p4 ∈ [1/4 − λ, 1/4 + λ] where λ = 1/n
31.
Next we set the utilities of the new traders appropriately so that along each directed edge TiTj
of GM with segments TiS1, S1S2, . . . , SℓTj , the G1-allocation variable of Ti is “almost faithfully”
copied along the edge, by the G1-allocation variables of traders S1S2, . . . , Sℓ−1Sℓ and SℓTj finally.
As a result, we are able to use the G1-allocation variable of SℓTj, instead of that of Ti, to influence
the utility of Tj, by replacing the G1-variable of Ti in the utility function of Tj with the G1-variable
of SℓTj. The goal is to preserve the original reduction while making the influence graph of the new
market planar. To this end, we set the utilities of the new traders as follows.
Let S1, S2, S3, S4 and S be five intersection points in S such that S1S, SS2 are on the same edge
of GM and S3S, SS4 are on the same edge of GM. For convenience, we also use s1,i, s2,i, s3,i and
s4,i to denote the Gi-variable of traders S1S, SS2, S3S and SS4, respectively, and si to denote the
Gi-variable of S. We set the utility functions of S, S3 and S4 as follows so that in any ǫ-approximate
market equilibrium, s2,1 is very close to s1,1 and s4,1 is very close to s3,1.
1. The utility of S depends on all traders S1S, SS2, S3S and SS4. The slopes of the goods are:
1 + s1,1 + s2,2, 1 + s2,1 + s1,2, 1 + s3,1 + s4,2 and 1 + s4,1 + s3,2.
2. The utility of SS2 only depends on S. The slopes of the four goods are:
1 + s1, 1 + s2, 0 and 0.
3. The utility of SS4 only depends on S. The slopes of the four goods are:
1 + s3, 1 + s4, 0 and 0.
Lemma 5 then follows from simple case analysis.
Lemma 5. In any ǫ-approximate equilibrium, we have |s2,1 − s1,1|, |s4,1 − s3,1| ≤ 1/n
21.
This completes the construction. With Lemma 5, one can prove new versions of Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3. Using the fact that there more than n2 traders in the market, Theorem 3 then follows.
3.3 Markets with Threshold Influence Utilities
In this section, we reduce Sparse-Nash to the following market equilibrium problem:
Planar-Threshold-Market: The input is a market M = (G,T ,wi, ui) satisfying
all conditions of Theorem 1, in which every utility is a normalized threshold influence
function and the influence graph GM is planar and has constant degree. The output is
an m−11-approximate market equilibrium, where m = |T |.
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Theorem 4. Planar-Threshold-Market is PPAD-hard.
To this end, we use the polynomial-time reduction from Sparse-Nash to classical Arrow-Debreu
markets with additively separable and piecewise linear utility functions presented in [3].
We first briefly review the reduction, and then revise it to get a reduction from Sparse-Nash
to Planar-Threshold-Market. Now let (A,B) be an n × n sparse two-player game, then the
classical Arrow-Debreu market constructed in [3] has h = 2n+ 2 goods and m = Θ(n2) traders:
1. For every trader T , her utility function u is additively separable: u(x) =
∑
i∈[h] ui(xi),
where x = (x1, . . . , xh) is the allocation of T . Every ui is either the zero function or a
2-piecewise-linear function:
ui(x) = ai · x, for x ∈ [0, θi] and ui(x) = ai · θ + bi(x− θi), for x > θi,
for some ai ≥ bi > 0 and 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1/n
4.
2. Every utility function u is sparse: There are only constant many i ∈ [h] such that ui is
not the zero function.
3. The economy graph of the market is strongly connected.
4. The total supply of good Gi, for every i ∈ [h], is Θ(1).
Moreover, given any n−13-(strongly)-approximate market equilibrium of M, one can construct an
n−6-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B) in polynomial time. (Note that the approximation
notion used in [3] is stronger, in which both conditions 2 and 3 of Definition 6 must hold exactly.)
Now usingM, we construct a new marketM∗ with threshold influence utility functions, whose
influence graph is both constant-degree and planar: At the beginningM∗ is empty. Then for every
trader T in M with initial endowment w and utility function u(x) =
∑
i∈[h] ui(xi), (we know that
every ui is either the zero function or a 2-piecewise-linear function with parameters (ai, bi, θi)) we
let S denote the set of i ∈ [h] such that ui is not the zero function.
Create |S|+ 1 traders T ∗, T ∗i , i ∈ S, in the new market M
∗. For each i ∈ S, the initial
endowment of T ∗i is (1/n
4) · ei, where ei denotes the ith unit vector. Let x = (x1, . . . , xh)
denote the allocation variables of T ∗i , then her utility function is simply u(x) = xi. The
initial endowment of T ∗ is set to be w and the utility function u∗ of T ∗ depends on the
allocation variables of T ∗i , i ∈ [S]. We set the parameters of her utility function
appropriately so that u∗ is exactly u (the utility of T in M) if for every i ∈ [S], the
allocation of T ∗i is exactly (1/n
4) · ei.
This finishes the construction of M∗ from (A,B).
It is easy to check that the influence graph of M∗ is constant-degree and planar. The economy
graph of M∗ is strongly connected, and the total supply of Gi, i ∈ [h], is still Θ(1).
Now we sketch the proof of correctness. First of all, one can prove that in any n−22-(weakly)-
approximate equilibrium ofM∗ the allocation of any trader T ∗i (as in the construction above) must
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be very close to (1/n4)ei and thus, the utility function of T
∗ is very close to that of T in M. As a
result, the preferences of the traders T ∗ inM∗ are very similar to those of traders T inM. One can
then follow the proof of [3] closely to show that, given any n−22-(weakly)-approximate equilibrium
of M∗, an n−6-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B) can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 4 then follows from the fact that m = Θ(n2).
4 Algorithm for Markets with Hierarchical Influence Graphs
In this section, we consider the special case when the market M has only a constant number of
goods and the underlying influence graph is hierarchical. The utility of every trader in M is either
a linear influence function or a threshold influence function, and the market satisfies all conditions
of Theorem 1. We use h = |G| to denote the number of goods, which is a constant, and use m = |T |
to denote the number of traders. Then we show that
Theorem 5. If M has an equilibrium (p,x1, . . . ,xm) in which for every i ∈ [h], 1/pi is bounded
above by ma for some constant a, then a 1/poly(m)-approximate market equilibrium of M can be
found in time mO(logm).
Notice that even for markets with a constant-degree and planar influence graph, this problem
(with the guarantee that M has an equilibrium in which none of the prices is negligible) is PPAD-
hard, as implied by the polynomial-time reduction presented in Section 3.2 (since we know all the
four prices must be 1/4 in any equilibrium).
4.1 Existence of Approximate Equilibria with Discrete Prices
Let M be a market with (normalized) linear and threshold utility functions. For convenience, we
assume the total supply of each good is exactly 1.
We assume M has an equilibrium (p∗,x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
m) with p
∗
i > 1/m
a for some constant a > 0.
Let ǫ = 1/mb for some constant b > 0. Then we can round the equilibrium (p∗,x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
m):
pi =
⌈p∗i ·N⌉
N
and x∗k,i =
⌈x∗k,i ·N⌉
N
, where N = ⌈m2a+b+3⌉,
to get a new tuple (p,x1, . . . ,xm) in which every entry is a multiple of 1/N . Using the definition,
it can be checked that (p,x1, . . . ,xm) must be an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium
2 of M with
1 ≤
∑
i∈[h] pi ≤ 2 and
∑
k∈[m] xk,i ≤ 2, for all i ∈ [h]. (4)
For convenience, we say a vector is discrete if all of its entries are multiples of 1/N .
As a consequence, to find an ǫ-approximate equilibrium of M, we only need to enumerate all
discrete price vectors p that satisfy (4). For each vector p we check whether there exists a discrete
tuple (x1, . . . ,xm), satisfying (4), such that (p,x1, . . . ,xm) is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium of M.
2More exactly, we need to normalize the vector p so that
∑
i∈[h] pi = 1.
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Notably there are only polynomially many vectors p to check, when h is a constant. Next we show
for every p, the checking can be done in time mO(logm) for trees and hierarchical influence graphs.
Theorem 5 then follows.
4.2 Trees and Hierarchical Influence Graphs
Let p be any discrete price vector that satisfies (4).
We start with the simplest case when the influence graph GM is a complete binary tree. Every
node v in the tree is a trader, and every edge is bidirectional (and thus, the influence between two
connected traders is also bidirectional). Due to the tree structure, every trader v can influence (at
most) three traders in the market. We use wv to denote the initial endowment of v, with budget
bv = wv · p.
To verify whether p is an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium price vector, we use the following
top-down and divide-and-conquer algorithm Check-Tree(T ,x,y):
1. T is a complete binary tree with r as its root; and
2. Both x and y are h-dimensional discrete vectors.
The algorithm then returns a collection of vector {xv : v ∈ T } such that
1. xr = x and
∑
v∈T xv = y; and
2. For every v ∈ T (including r), xv is an ǫ-approximately feasible and ǫ-approximately
optimal bundle for v with respect to p and her neighbors’ allocations,
if such a tuple exists; and the algorithm returns ‘nil’ otherwise.
To verify whether p is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium price, we only need to call the Check-Tree
with T being the whole binary tree, and x,y being all possible discrete vectors satisfying (4). This
gives us an algorithm with time complexity (2N)2h times the complexity of Check-Tree.
Check-Tree runs recursively as follows:
1. The case when T is a single node is trivial: One simply checks whether x = y and x is also
approximately budget-feasible and approximately optimal for the trader.
2. Otherwise, let r be the root of T and let T1 and T2 be the two subtrees of r. We then
enumerate all possibilities of x1 for the root of T1, denoted by r1; x2 for the root of T2,
denoted by r2; y1 for T1 as the total consumption of T1; and y2 as the total consumption
of T2, such that
(a) xr = x and xr + y1 + y2 = y;
(b) xr = x is approximately feasible and optimal for r, given p as the price vector
and x1 and x2 as the allocations of r1 and r2, respectively.
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For any combination of (x1,x2,y1,y2) that satisfies the conditions above, we modify the
utility of r1 and r2 by replacing the allocation variables of r, in the utility functions of r1
and r2, with xr. Then we recursively call Check-Tree(T1,x1,y1) and Check-Tree(T2,x2,y2).
If neither call returns ‘nil’, we concatenate the outputs with xr and output.
If we use ℓ, the depth of the tree, to measure the time complexity TIME(h) of Check-Tree, then
TIME(ℓ) = TIME(ℓ− 1) ·NO(1).
Thus, TIME(ℓ) = NO(ℓ) and hence the running time of Check-Tree measured using m, the number
of traders in the market, is mO(logm).
Clearly this divide-and-conquer approach can be applied to any market with a constant-degree
tree influence graph. More generally, it can be applied to the following family of graphs which we
call hierarchical graphs:
Definition 9 (Hierarchical Graphs). We call G a k-hierarchical graph, if there is a tree T such
that we can label every vertex v in G with a node w in T :
1. For every w in T that is not a leaf, the number of vertices in G labeled with w is between 1
and k; (If w is a leaf, then this number can be arbitrarily large.)
2. There is an edge from v1 to v2 and from v2 to v1 if v1 and v2 has the same lable and the label
is not a leaf in T ;
3. There is an edge from v1 to v2 and from v2 to v1 if the labels of v1, v2 are neighbors in T .
When k and the degree of the underlying tree are constant, the divide-and-conquer approach also
yields an algorithm for finding a 1/poly(m)-approximate market equilibrium with time complexity
mO(logm), when the market has an equilibrium in which the price of each good is bounded below
by 1/na, for some constant a.
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A Existence of Equilibria in Markets with Social Influence
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. We will use the following fixed point theorem [19]:
Theorem 6 (Kakutani). Let S be a non-empty, compact and convex subset of Rn. Let φ : S → 2S
be an upper semicontinuous correspondence such that φ(x) is non-empty, closed and convex for all
x ∈ S. Then φ has a fixed point x∗ ∈ S such that x∗ ∈ φ(x∗).
To prove Theorem 1 using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we follow the strategy used by Scarf
[24] and recently by Vazirani and Yannakakis [25]. Given a market, we construct a correspondence
φ over the product space of prices and allocations. Then we show that φ satisfies all the conditions
of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Moreover, every fixed point of φ must be an equilibrium of the
market. Theorem 1 then follows.
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A.1 The Correspondence φ
Recall that the total supply of each good Gi in the market is 1, and all parameters (wk,i, ck,i, dk,i
as well as the weights in fk,i) are between 0 and 1.
We let L be a large enough integer so that 2L ≥ 4mh2 and for all k ∈ [m] and i ∈ [h],
either ck,i − dk,i = 0 or ck,i − dk,i ≥ 2
−L.
The domain of the correspondence φ is [0, 1.1]hm × P , where P is the space of prices p:
S =
{
p ∈ Rh+
∣∣∣ ∑i∈[h] pi = 1 and pi ≥ c for all i ∈ [h]},
where c = 1/(m · 23mL). (As will become clear later, we require all prices to be positive (≥ c) to
make sure that φ is semicontinuous.) φ maps (x1, . . . ,xm,p), where xk ∈ [0, 1.1]
h for all k ∈ [m]
and p ∈ P , to the set of all tuples (x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
m,p
∗) that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Let x =
∑
k∈[m] xk, then p
∗ ∈ P and x · p∗ ≥ x · p′ for all p′ ∈ P ; and
2. For each k ∈ [m], x∗k ∈ [0, 1.1]
h is one of the optimal budget-feasible bundles for Tk:
(a) x∗k · p ≤ wk · p; and
(b) uk(x
∗
k,x−k) ≥ uk(x
′
k,x−k) for all x
′
k ∈ [0, 1.1]
h such that x′k · p ≤ wk · p.
This completes the definition of φ.
One can verify that, if the utility functions uk satisfy all the conditions of Theorem 1, then φ
satisfies all the conditions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, and has at least one fixed point.
A.2 Every Fixed Point is a Market Equilibrium
Let (x1, . . . ,xm,p) be a fixed point: (x1, . . . ,xm,p) ∈ φ(x1, . . . ,xm,p). Also let x =
∑
k∈[m] xk.
We divide the proof into several lemmas. First we show that xi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [h].
Lemma 6. If (x1, . . . ,xm,p) is a fixed point of φ, then xi < 1.1 for all i ∈ [h].
Proof. If xi = 1.1 for some i ∈ [h], then by the optimality of p we must have xj = 1.1 for all j ∈ [h]
such that pj > c. As a result, we have∑
k∈[m]
xk · p = x · p =
∑
j:pj=c
xj · pj +
∑
j:pj>c
xj · pj ≥ 1.1
∑
j:pj>c
pj.
However,
∑
j:pj>c
pj is at least 1− hc and we have
1.1 · (1− hc) > 1 =
∑
k∈[m]
wk · p,
which contradicts with the assumption that every xk is budget-feasible.
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Then we show that xi > c for all i ∈ [h]. We need the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Let (x1, . . . ,xm,p) be any fixed point of φ. Let Tk ∈ T be a trader with budget w =
wk · p > 0 and her function uk is nonsatiated with respected to Gi ∈ G. Then we must have
pi ≥
w
22L
.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that pi < w/2
2L. By the assumption, we have ck,i ≥ 2
−L (and
ck,i − dk,i ≥ 2
−L, for threshold influence functions), and the bang-per-buck of Gi is at least
2−L
w/22L
=
2L
w
.
On the other hand, the slope of any good Gj in the market is
ck,j + fk,j ≤ 1 +mh.
Now let S ⊆ [h] be the set of index j such that
pj >
w(1 +mh)
2L
.
For every j ∈ S, the bang-per-buck of Gj is at most
1 +mh
pj
<
2L
w
,
and is strictly smaller than that of Gi. Therefore, by the optimality of xk, we have xk,j = 0 for all
j ∈ S unless xi = 1.1. However, by Lemma 6 we have xi < 1.1 and thus, xk,j = 0 for all j ∈ S. We
then get a contradiction since the total cost of the bundle is
∑
j /∈S
xk,j · pj < 1.1
∑
j /∈S
pj ≤ 1.1h ·
w(1 +mh)
2L
≤
4mh2 · w
2L
≤ w,
and thus, xk is not optimal.
Corollary 1. If (x1, . . . ,xm,p) is a fixed point of φ, then pi > c for all i ∈ [h].
Proof. Assume for contradiction that p1 = c. Then by condition 3 of Theorem 1, we assume that
the utility function uk of Tk is nonsatiated with respect to G1.
As the total budget of all the m traders is 1, there must be a trader Tk′ ∈ T whose budget is
wk′ · p ≥ 1/m. Moreover, since the economy graph HM is strongly connected, there is a sequence
of at most m traders: Tk′ = Ti0 , Ti1 , . . . , Ti,ℓ−1, Ti,ℓ = Tk such that there is an edge from Tis+1 to
Tis for all s : 0 ≤ s ≤ ℓ− 1.
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We then prove the following bound on the budget of Tis by induction on s:
the budget of Tis ≥
1
m · 23sL
, for all s : 0 ≤ s ≤ ℓ. (5)
The base when s = 0 is trivial. Assume (5) is true for s ≥ 0. Because there is an edge from Tis+1
to Tis , there exists a good Gj such that wis+1,j > 0 (and thus, > 2
−L by assumption) and uis is
nonsatiated with respect to Gj . Since the budget of Tis is at least 1/(m · 2
3sL), by Lemma 7
pj ≥
1
m · 23sL · 22L
.
As a result, the budget of Tis+1 is at least
wis+1,j · pj ≥
1
m · 23(s+1)L
.
This finishes the induction.
As a result, the budget of Tk = Ti,ℓ is at least
1
m · 23ℓL
>
1
m · 23(m−1)L
,
contradicting with p1 = c and Lemma 7.
Now we have pi > c for all i ∈ [h]. Since p maximizes x · p, we must have
x1 = x2 = . . . = xn.
To finish the proof, we show that they must all equal to 1. To this end, if x1 > 1 then we have∑
k∈[m]
xk · p = x · p >
∑
i∈[h]
pi = 1 =
∑
k∈[m]
wk · p,
which contradicts the assumption that every xk is budget-feasible. And if x1 < 1, then
x · p = x1
∑
i∈[h]
pi < 1 =
∑
k∈[m]
wk · p.
As a result, one of the traders Tk did not exhaust her budget. By the concavity and nonsatiation
of uk, this contradicts with the optimality of xk.
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